PhD Research
Building on the tech and innovation-driven motto ‘move fast and break things’, the research encapsulates the complete opposite rationale. That is, ‘move fast and break nothing’. At least, that’s what the main digital platforms are currently proposing through their new privacy policies. Against this background, the research uncovers the hidden gaps that have been left unaddressed when interpreting and considering the interplay between EU competition law and data protection regulation.
Stemming from the current approach towards characterising data protection deteriorations as anti-competitive harms, the research question reverses the nature of these cases. That is, if dominant companies were to propose GDPR-compliant rules in the market, would there be an absence of competition harm as a result? Or would the answer to the question be more convoluted?
Index
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I - DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
1. The two (economic) states of the world: more data processing versus welfare.
2. The data-intensive digital platforms.
3. The consideration of data protection and privacy considerations in the EU competition law framework.
CHAPTER II - THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION AND EU COMPETITION LAW FROM THE REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE
1. The EU corpus of law vis-à-vis regulation.
2. Regulation: homonymy and the relationship of competition law with the rest of EU public policy objectives.
3. Digital platforms as ecosystems.
CHAPTER III - PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES UNDER THE LENS OF EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW
1. PETs in the larger environment of EU data protection regulation.
2. The application of PETs in the competition law framework.
CHAPTER IV - THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS, DIGITAL PLATFORMS AS PUBLIC UTILITIES AND POLICY CHOICES
1. Relationship with Article 106 TFEU: sports organisations and its potential extension to digital ecosystem orchestration.
2. Non-discrimination in the context of digital platforms: the Google Shopping case.
3. Application of the same rationale to the GDPR and the DMA: mismatch of concepts, inverse abnormality and openness.
CONCLUSIONS
And a small taste of the thesis...
Thesis_last version-29-43.pdf